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Abstract
We show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse se-
lection and moral hazard can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear
programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete charac-
terization of the optima. Our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated
with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information.
Because these welfare effects may generate non-convexities, incentive efficient
allocations may involve randomization. Other properties of incentive efficient
allocations are also derived.
JEL Classification Numbers. D82, D61, C61.
Key Words: asymmetric information; incentive efficiency; linear programming;
duality.
2
1 Introduction
It is well known that informational asymmetries generate adverse selection and moral
hazard problems. To take these problems into account, in addition to the standard
resource constraints, an allocation must satisfy incentive compatibility constraints:
agents must be given incentives to truthfully reveal their private characteristics and
actions. Despite great progress in understanding these environments, the characteri-
zation of economies under asymmetric information remains problematic. For example,
there is no clear consensus about the theory of competitive markets with asymmetric
information. Adapting the well-established techniques of linear programming and
duality theory to characterize efficient allocations under asymmetric information, we
study the role of incentive compatibility in determining allocations.
The point of departure of this work is the classic contribution of Prescott and
Townsend [23]. Those authors investigate the extent to which standard methods for
the analysis of efficient allocations and their decentralization as competitive equili-
bria can be applied to environments with asymmetric information. Using a framework
which embeds a large class of economies, and showing that lotteries play a role in the
analysis, they demonstrate that competitive equilibria exist and are incentive efficient
when trading takes place before the asymmetry of information is realized (e.g. moral
hazard). However, their approach does not extend to economies where trading takes
place after the asymmetric information is realized (e.g. adverse selection). Our main
contribution to the insights of Prescott and Townsend is to exploit the linear struc-
ture that arises when lotteries are allowed for, and which, as Myerson [21] shows, is
inherent to environments where incentive constraints are relevant. Framing the ana-
lysis in terms of linear programming allows us to obtain a complete characterization
of the set of incentive efficient allocations. Also, duality emerges as a powerful tool
to study these environments. Our findings point to the presence of external effects
associated with the incentives of agents to reveal their private characteristics as the
source of the problems encountered by Prescott and Townsend in decentralizing effi-
cient allocations with adverse selection. Our results are reminiscent of Myerson’s [22]
linear programming characterization of efficient mechanisms in cooperative games
with incomplete information and, in particular, of the concept of virtual utilities.
We introduce the linear programming methodology using two simple economies.
The first is an adverse selection insurance economy similar to the one used by Roth-
schild and Stiglitz [25] and Wilson [28]. The second is a moral hazard variation of
the first. In both cases, we show that incentive efficient allocations (i.e. allocations
which are Pareto optimal in the set of resource feasible and incentive compatible allo-
cations) can be determined as solutions to a linear programming problem. Then we
3
use the primal problem, its dual, and their corresponding complementary slackness
conditions to obtain a precise and simple characterization of these allocations.
The adverse selection model is a standard insurance economy with two types of
agents, high-and-low risk, and two possible idiosyncratic endowment states. Follow-
ing Prescott and Townsend [23], we define allocations in the space of lotteries over
bundles of contingent commodities. A lottery is just a random insurance plan. In-
surance claims are assumed perfectly verifiable and fully enforceable.1 Agents have
von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences. Therefore, their objective function as well as
their incentive constraints are linear in the lotteries. Incentive efficient allocations can
then be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem; more pre-
cisely, a Linear Semi-Infinite Programming problem. We derive the “dual problem”
and use the complementary slackness theorem to obtain a complete characterization
of the set of incentive efficient allocations. We also show that there is no loss of
generality in restricting attention to lotteries with finite support. Then we derive
properties of incentive efficient allocations as well as conditions under which lotteries
can be dispensed with.
The main economic insights of the model arise from the use of duality theory.
In the “dual problem” we identify the welfare effects arising from constraints on
the allocation. Apart from the standard welfare effects (i.e., utilities and economic
costs) we find others associated with the incentives of the agents to reveal their
types. Intuitively, a given allocation may be relatively costly because it gives a
greater incentive to one type of agent to misrepresent their type. For instance, all
actuarially fair insurance plans for the low-risk agents generate identical economic
costs. However, those plans that are more attractive to the high-risk agents imply
higher total welfare costs. The reason is that under such plans it becomes more costly
to prevent the high-risk agents from lying about their type (i.e., more resources are
needed to induce truthful revelation). That is, an external cost arises as a result of
the effect of the assignment to the low-risk agents on the high-risk agents.
Incentive efficient allocations must internalize the welfare effects of incentives. Our
analysis shows that these welfare effects may generate non-convexities. Hence, some of
the incentive efficient allocations may be random. The source of these non-convexities
lies in differences in preferences for risk across types. For instance, randomization is
beneficial when low-risk agents are risk neutral and high-risk agents are risk averse.
In this case, any fair insurance plan is equally good for a low-risk agent and equally
1Bisin and Gottardi [5] and Bisin and Guaitoli [7] depart from this “exclusive” benchmark and
study competitive economies with non-verifiable trades. Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [11] study
environments where asymmetric information arises from the possibility of default.
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costly in terms of resources. However, a random insurance plan generates lower
external costs because it involves higher risk and is thus less attractive for a high-
risk agent. In general, whenever the incentives of the high-risk agents are at issue,
and as long as these agents are sufficiently more risk averse than low-risk agents,
assigning a lottery to the latter will reduce the external cost of the assignment and
may allow a welfare improvement. By contrast, if low-risk agents are at least as risk
averse as high-risk agents then the optimal insurance plan of the low-risk agents is
deterministic.
The analysis of the moral hazard economy is very similar. In this economy, there
is a continuum of ex ante identical agents and two possible idiosyncratic endowment
states. Each agent can exert either high or low effort at a direct utility cost. Higher
effort reduces the probability of ending up in the poor state. The main difference
compared with the adverse selection model is that allocations may now involve two
kinds of randomization: not only a random insurance plan, but also a random effort
level. In this economy, a given insurance plan may be relatively costly because it
gives a greater incentive to the agents to deviate from an optimal high effort level.
If risk aversion decreases fast enough with effort, the welfare cost of incentives may
be non-convex and optimal insurance plans may be random. Effort may also be
random. When their effort is high, agents have higher expected wealth, but this
comes at a direct utility cost. In some instances, agents may be willing to give up
some consumption to reduce their effort. The tradeoff between consumption and effort
is resolved by allowing the agent to provide low effort with some positive probability
at the cost of reducing his expected consumption. We find that if the agents’ expected
wealth is large enough, or if the cost of effort increases fast enough with consumption,
incentive efficient allocations involve random effort.
Related Literature. A recent paper by Bisin and Gottardi [6] analyzes an adverse
selection economy as one with consumption externalities . Because consumption plans
must satisfy incentive constraints, the consumption plan of one agent type affects the
set of admissible plans of the other type. These authors construct an appropriately
enlarged market structure which allows then to decentralize incentive efficient allo-
cations. Greenwald and Stiglitz [13] and Arnott, Greenwald and Stiglitz [2] also em-
phasize the importance of external effects in economies with asymmetric information,
but there, the external effects are modeled as exogenous. We show that the external
effects arise endogenously once incentive constraints are explicitly considered.
The idea that lotteries help separate types on the basis of their attitude towards
risk is discussed by Prescott and Townsend [23, 24] and further investigated by
Cole [10] and Arnott and Stiglitz [3]. Using duality theory, we can bring to light
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the welfare analysis underlying this discussion and establish a formal link between
the separating role of lotteries and the presence of non-convexities arising from the
welfare effects of incentives. In recent work, Kehoe, Levine and Prescott [18] study
an exchange economy where agents trade after they learn their type. They show that
if the agents’ preferences display decreasing absolute risk aversion then lotteries are
suboptimal. We obtain analogous results, also based on absolute risk aversion, for
the case of adverse selection and moral hazard.
Bennardo and Chiappori [4] study a moral hazard economy characterized by the
presence of both idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty where consumption and
leisure are complementary goods. They show that if the cost of effort increases fast
enough with consumption, incentive efficient allocations involve a random
effort level. We obtain similar results for the case of purely idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty and show that optimal effort is random also if the aggregate endowment is
sufficiently large.
Our approach is inspired by the work of Makowski and Ostroy [20]. These au-
thors use a linear programming model to study large economies with full information.
Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1999) present a similar linear programming treatment of
large assignment economies. This work is a first step in trying to introduce incentive
constraints in these models.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the adverse
selection model. We set up the linear programming problem and its dual. Then we
use the complementary slackness theorem to characterize incentive efficient allocations
and study their properties. Section 3 presents a similar analysis for the case of moral
hazard. The proofs are deferred to the Appendix which involves an application of
Linear Semi-Infinite Programming.
2 Adverse Selection
2.1 The Economy
Consider an exchange economy with a single consumption good and a continuum of
agents of two types i = L,H. The fraction of agents of type i is denoted by ξi.
The agents in the economy are subject to idiosyncratic endowment shocks. Spe-
cifically, each agent can be in one of two states s = 1, 2. At each state, the agent is
endowed with a different amount ωs of the good, where 0 < ω1 < ω2. The probability
that state 1 (the low endowment state) is realized is higher for an agent of type H
(“high risk”) than for an agent of type L (“low risk”). These probabilities will be
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denoted by θH and θL, respectively, so that 0 < θL < θH < 1. Agents of type i
have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over contingent co nsumption plans as
defined by the Bernoulli utility function Ui : R+ → R, where Ui is twice continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave with limc→0 U
′
i(c) = ∞ and
limc→∞ U
′
i(c) = 0.
2
Idiosyncratic shocks are independent across agents, rendering no uncertainty at
the aggregate level.3 Ex post, the fraction of type-i agents with a low endowment is
θi, and the average endowment of the type-i group is ω¯i = θiω1 + (1 − θi)ω2. The
ex-post aggregate endowment is given by ω¯ = ξLω¯L + (1− ξL)ω¯H .
Agents choose their contingent consumption plans before the realization of the
individual shock. The structure of individual uncertainty is common knowledge and
the realization of the endowment shocks is observable. State-contingent net trades
are perfectly verifiable and fully enforceable ex post. However, an individual agent’s
type is known only to herself.
2.2 Allocations
In this section, we define the space of allocations and describe allocations which
are physically feasible and incentive compatible. Then we define incentive efficient
allocations.
Let Z denote the net trade set of an agent; that is, the set of all pairs z = (z1, z2) ∈
R
2 such that zs ≥ −ωs for s = 1, 2. For any z ∈ Z, the expected net trade of an agent
of type i is given by
ri(z1, z2) = θiz1 + (1− θi)z2,
and her expected utility is defined as
EUi(z1, z2) = θiUi(ω1 + z1) + (1− θi)Ui(ω2 + z2).
An allocation in this economy is a random net trade assignment for each type.
That is, before the realization of individual uncertainty, each agent receives a lottery
2Our model is slightly more general than the Rothschild-Stiglitz [25] economy, where state utilities
are type-invariant. As we will see, differences in tastes across types may have important consequences
for the nature of the incentive efficient allocations. All results can be extended to state-dependent
utilities and to any finite number of idiosyncratic states.
3The measurability problems associated with the aggregation of a continuum of independent and
identically distributed random variables are well known; see Judge [17]. A way around this problem,
as shown by Sun [27], is to consider a process of individual uncertainty which is measurable with
respect to hyperfinite Loeb product spaces. For such processes almost sure pairwise independence
guarantees the validity of the law of large numbers (see Sun [27, Theorem 3.10, p. 436]). For
alternative approaches to this problem see Al-Najjar [1] and Hammond and Lisboa [15].
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depending on her type. The realization of this lottery determines a net trade, and
thus, a contingent consumption plan for the agent. Formally, an allocation is a pair
of probability measures on Z. Denote the space of Borel measures on Z which have
compact support by Mc(Z). The space of allocations is the set of pairs (xL, xH) ∈
Mc(Z)×Mc(Z) such that∫
Z
dxi = 1, xi ≥ 0, i = L,H.
4 (2.1)
Here, xi is a probability measure describing the lottery assigned to each agent of
type i. For any Borel set B ⊂ Z, xi(B) is the probability that the agent is assigned
a net trade z ∈ B. Under this formulation, deterministic assignments are given by
degenerate measures. The law of large numbers implies that xi is also the distribution
of net trades of type-i agents once the outcomes of all individual lotteries are realized
(e.g. xi(B) is the fraction of agents of type i assigned to a net trade z ∈ B).
An allocation is feasible if the aggregate net trade is non-positive. The average
net trade of the agents of type i is given by 〈ri, xi〉 =
∫
Z
ridxi. Hence, the aggregate
resource constraint is
ξL〈rL, xL〉+ (1− ξL)〈rH , xH〉 ≤ 0. (2.2)
Since types are private information, an agent of type i may claim to be any of the
two types j = 1, 2, and receive expected utility 〈EUi, xj〉 =
∫
Z
EUidxj . An allocation
is incentive compatible if it is not in the interest of agents to misrepresent their type:
〈EUi, xi〉 ≥ 〈EUi, xj〉, j 6= i, i = L,H. (2.3)
An allocation is incentive efficient if it is feasible, incentive compatible, and there
exists no other feasible and incentive compatible allocation that is weakly preferred
by both types and strictly preferred by at least one type.
2.3 The Primal and Dual Problems
In this section, we show that every incentive efficient allocation is an optimal solution
to a linear programming problem.
The problem of the planner is to find an allocation so as to maximize a weighted
average of the utilities of the two types subject to the feasibility and the incentive
constraints. Note that utilities are linear in the lotteries. Constraints (2.1)-(2.3) are
also linear. In order to extend the inner product notation 〈· , ·〉 to the adding-up
constraint (2.1), we define I : Z → {0, 1} to be the characteristic function on Z
and write 〈I, xi〉 =
∫
Z
dxi for i = L,H. For given positive welfare weights (γL, γH),
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with γH = 1 − γL, the problem of the planner is to find an allocation (xL, xH) ∈
Mc(Z)×Mc(Z) to solve
(D) sup γL〈EUL, xL〉 + (1− γL)〈EUH , xH〉
s.t.
〈I, xL〉 = 1, (2.4)
〈I, xH〉 = 1, (2.5)
−〈EUL, xL〉 + 〈EUL, xH〉 ≤ 0, (2.6)
〈EUH , xL〉 − 〈EUH , xH〉 ≤ 0, (2.7)
ξL〈rL, xL〉 + (1− ξL)〈rH , xH〉 ≤ 0, (2.8)
xL, xH ≥ 0. (2.9)
Problem (D) is a linear programming problem. Standard results in linear program-
ming theory show that problem (D) is dual to another linear programming problem,
known as the primal problem or problem (P ). Whereas problem (D) is a maximiza-
tion problem with an infinite number of variables and a finite number of constraints,
problem (P ) is a minimization problem with a finite number of variables and an infi-
nite number of constraints. In optimization theory, these kind of problems are known
as Linear Semi-Infinite Programming (LSIP) problems.5 As we shall see, the primal
and dual problems are related because the primal variables are also the shadow prices
of the dual constraints, and vice versa.
Problem (P ), which is derived in detail in Appendix A, consists of finding a
quintuple (αL, αH, βL, βH, q) ∈ R
5 to solve
(P ) inf αL + αH
s.t.
αL ≥ γLEUL(z) + βLEUL(z)− βHEUH(z)− qξLrL(z)
∀z ∈ Z, (2.10)
αH ≥ (1 − γL)EUH(z)− βLEUL(z) + βHEUH(z)− q(1− ξL)rH(z)
∀z ∈ Z, (2.11)
βL, βH, q ≥ 0, (2.12)
5An LSIP problem is an optimization problem with linear objective and linear constraints in
which either number of variables or the number of constraints is finite. For an excellent survey on
LSIP theory, see Goberna and Lo´pez [12].
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where (αL, αH) are the shadow prices of the adding-up constraints (2.4) and (2.5),
(βL, βH) are the shadow prices of the incentive constraints (2.6) and (??), and q is
the shadow price of the resource constraint (2.8).
Denote the optimal values for problems (P ) and (D) by ν(P ) and ν(D), respec-
tively. It is easy to see that both problems are consistent (i.e. their feasible sets are
not empty) as well as bounded (i.e. ν(P ) and ν(D) are finite).6 However, unlike an
ordinary linear program, a bounded LSIP problem need not have optimal solutions.
Moreover, the primal and dual problems need not have the same optimal value, as a
“positive duality gap” may occur: ν(P ) − ν(D) > 0. The next two theorems show
that the problems in this paper are well-behaved.
Theorem 2.1 ν(D) = ν(P ).
Theorem 2.2 Problems (P ) and (D) have optimal solutions.
Hence, the maximum in problem (D) and the minimum in problem (P ) are well-
defined and they are equal. A nice property of the dual problem is that the space
of variables can be restricted without loss of generality to measures with finite sup-
port. Proposition 2.1 below establishes the formal result. Let MF denote the set of
finitely supported measures on Z. Consider the restricted dual problem, (DF ), where
allocations are defined in MF ×MF . Denote its optimal value by ν(DF ).
Proposition 2.1 Problem (DF ) has optimal solutions. Further, ν(DF ) = ν(D).
Results of this kind are common to many LSIP programs (Goberna and Lo´pez [12]).
2.4 Full Information
To gain some insight into the linear programming framework, we first consider the
case of full information. This case provides a benchmark for the rest of the analysis.
When agent types are public information, a simpler pair of LSIP problems obtains.
Theorems 2.2 and 2.1 and Proposition 2.1 extend to these problems. The dual problem
(D0) is obtained by eliminating the incentive constraints in (D). Every first best
6The allocation under autarky (where both types have zero net trade) is feasible and incentive
compatible, so problem (D) is consistent. In problem (P ), let βL = βH = 0 and q = q
0 > 0.
Since EUi is strictly concave, the right-hand side of both (2.10) and (2.11) is bounded on Z. Fixing
αL = α
0
L
and αH = α
0
H
sufficiently large ensures that (2.10) and (2.11) hold. By the weak duality
theorem (see Krabs [19, Theorem I.3.1]), since problems (P ) and (D) are consistent, they are also
bounded: γLEUL(0) + (1− γL)EUH (0) ≤ ν(D) ≤ ν(P ) ≤ α
0
L
+ α0
H
.
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allocation is an optimal solution to problem (D0) for some weight γL ∈ (0, 1). The
primal (P0) is obtained by eliminating the shadow prices of the incentive constraints,
βL and βH, and all the associated terms in (P ). Thus, the objective function in
problem (P0) is the same as in (P ), and the constraint systems are given by
αi ≥ vi(zi; q) ∀zi ∈ Z i = L,H; (2.13)
where
vi(zi; q) = γiEUi(zi)− qξiri(zi). (2.14)
Consider the terms in the function vi(zi; q). The first term, γiEUi(zi), is the
contribution to welfare when agents of type i have net trade zi. The second term,
qξiri(zi), is the value of the aggregate net trade of these agents when the shadow price
of the good is q. Thus, vi(zi; q) represents the net contribution to social welfare when
agents of type i have net trade zi and the shadow price of resources is q.
According to (2.13), a feasible value of αi is an upper bound of vi(· ; q) for given
q. The maximal net contribution of type-i agents at price q is defined as
v∗i (q) ≡ sup
zi∈Z
vi(zi; q) = sup
zi∈Z
{γiEUi(zi)− qξiri(zi)}, (2.15)
so the primal systems (2.13) can be put in the form
αi ≥ v
∗
i (q), i = L,H. (2.16)
Because the objective of problem (P0) is to minimize the sum of the αi’s, the
two constraints in (2.16) bind at an optimum. Thus, the optimal shadow price q∗ of
resources minimizes the sum of the types’ maximal net contributions:7
q∗ = arg
{
min
q≥0
{v∗L(q) + v
∗
H(q)}
}
,
while the optimal value of αi is the maximal net contribution of type i at price q
∗:
α∗i = vi(q
∗).
First best allocations. The complementary slackness theorem (see, for instance,
Krabs [19, Theorem I.3.3]) allows us to characterize optimal solutions for problems
7This full information economy is an example of the general problem studied by Makowski and
Ostroy [20]. In particular, α∗i (q) is the conjugate or indirect utility, redefined in its expected value
form for economies with uncertainty. These authors have shown how the fact that the constraints
of the primal program (the “pricing problem” in their terminology) can be incorporated into the
objective function is characteristic of the LP version of General Equilibrium.
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(P0) and (D0). According to the theorem, feasible solutions (αL, αH , q) and (xL, xH)
for problems (P0) and (D0), respectively, are optimal if and only if they satisfy the
complementary slackness conditions:
q
(
ξL〈rL, xL〉 + (1− ξL)〈rH , xH〉
)
= 0, (2.17)
αi = v
∗
i (q) = vi(zi; q) if xi(zi) > 0, i = L,H. (2.18)
Condition (2.17) states that the optimal shadow price q∗ is a complementary mul-
tiplier for the resource constraint (2.8). Since the monotonicity of preferences implies
that q∗ is positive, (2.17) implies that the aggregate net trade is zero. Condition
(2.18) states that the optimal assignments, x∗L and x
∗
H, are complementary multiplier
vectors for the respective constraint systems in (2.13). This implies that
x∗i puts weight only on net trades zi that maximize the net contribution to social
welfare of type i at price q∗. H owever, vi(· ; q
∗) is a strictly concave function, and
has at most one maximum. Thus, x∗i is a degenerate measure; that is, randomiza-
tion is never optimal. Further, it is easily verified that both types are fully insured
as their optimal consumption is independent of the realization of the idiosyncratic
shock. In summary, conditions (2.17)-(2.18) yield standard efficiency results for con-
vex economies with full information and no aggregate uncertainty: all agents are fully
insured and the aggregate consumption equals the aggregate endowment. We now
use a similar characterization to derive the more subtle properties of the optima when
agent types are private information.
2.5 Incentive Efficiency
When types are private information, allocations must provide incentives for the agents
to reveal their type. When γL is very large, first best allocations assign higher con-
sumption to type L than to type H, so agents of type H are inclined to lie. Similarly,
when γL is very low, first best allocations give higher consumption to type H, which
induces the agents of type L to lie. It is easily verified that, for some intermediate
weight, it is optimal that both types consume the ex-post average endowment w¯ with
certainty. This weight is given by
γ¯L =
(
1 +
(1 − ξL)U
′
L(ω¯)
ξLU
′
H(ω¯)
)−1
,
and corresponds to the only first best allocation that is also incentive compatible. The
next proposition describes a partitioning of the set of incentive effici ent allocations
into three regions according to which incentive compatibility constraint binds.
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Proposition 2.2 The set of incentive efficient allocations has three regions:
(i) When γL = γ¯L, the incentive efficient allocation assigns each type ω¯ units of
consumption in every state, and the two incentive constraints trivially bind.
Thus, βL = βH = 0.
(ii) When γ¯L < γL < 1, incentive efficient allocations assign higher expected con-
sumption to type L than to type H and, only the incentive constraint of type H
binds. In this case, βL = 0 and βH > 0 .
(iii) When 0 < γL < γ¯L, incentive efficient allocations assign higher expected con-
sumption to type H than to type L and, only the incentive constraint of type L
binds. In this case, βL > 0 and βH = 0.
Cases (ii) and (iii) in Proposition 2.2 are essentially symmetric and can be studied
separately.8
2.5.1 The incentives of type-H agents
In this section, we characterize incentive efficient allocations in which the incentive
constraint of type H binds. Throughout we let γL ∈ (γ¯L, 1) and assume, without loss
of generality, βL = 0.
The first constraint system in problem (P ) is given by
αL ≥ vL(zL;βH, q) ∀zL ∈ Z, (2.19)
where the function
vL(zL;βH, q) = γLEUL(zL)− qξLrL(zL)− βHEUH(zL) (2.20)
represents the net contribution to social welfare of type-L agents when types are
private information. The net contribution of type L is adjusted with respect to its
full information version and, unlike the latter, depends on the shadow price of the
incentive constraint of type H. Specifically, a new term arises which is not present
under full information: −βHEUH(zL). This term reflects an external cost that arises
as a result of the effect of the assignments to type L on type-H agents. That is, the
better the assignment of type L in the eyes of type-H agents, the more costly it is to
prevent the latter
8Prescott and Townsend [23, Section 3] characterize the set of incentive efficient allocations when
utilities are identical across types using the first-order conditions of the planner problem. In this
case, γ¯L = ξL.
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from lying. The total cost of assignments to type L is given by the sum of the
resource cost and the external cost: qξLrL(zL) + βHEUH(zL). When βH is positive,
the external cost is positive and, for a given q, the total shadow cost is higher than
under full information. Note that, since EUH(·) is strictly concave, the total cost is
not a convex function of zL.
The second constraint system is given by
αH ≥ vH(zH;βH, q) ∀zH ∈ Z, (2.21)
where the function
vH(zH;βH, q) = (1− γL)EUH(zH) − q(1− ξL)rH(zH) + βHEUH(zH) (2.22)
represents the net contribution to social welfare of type-H agents at prices βH and
q. The third term in the function reflects a benefit of assignments to type H on
the incentives of these agents. Clearly, the higher the utility that type-H agents
derive from their own assignment, the more incentives they have to report the truth.
The shadow cost of assignments to type H is given by the resource cost net of the
benefit on incentives: q(1−ξL)rH(zH)−βHEUH(zH). When βH is positive, the benefit
on incentives is positive and, for a given q, the total cost is lower than under full
information. In this case, however, the cost is a convex function of zH.
According to (2.19) and (2.21), a feasible value of αi is an upper bound of
vi(· ;βH, q) for given βH and q. The maximal net social contribution of type-i agents
at prices βH and q is defined as
v∗i (βH, q) ≡ sup
zi∈Z
vi(zi;βH, q). (2.23)
Constraints (2.19)-(2.21) can be expressed as
αi ≥ v
∗
i (βH, q), i = L,H. (2.24)
Thus, the optimal prices β∗H and q
∗ minimize the sum of the types’ maximal net
contributions:
(q∗, β∗H) ∈ arg
{
min
βH ,q≥0
v∗L(βH, q) + v
∗
H(βH, q)}
}
,
while the optimal net contributions are given by α∗i = v
∗
i (β
∗
H, q
∗) for i = L,H.
The principal result in this section is the characterization of incentive efficient
allocations. According to the complementary slackness theorem, feasible solutions
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(αL, αH , βH, q) and (xL, xH) for problems (P ) and (D) respectively, are optimal if
and only if:
βH(〈EUH , xH〉 − 〈EUH , xL〉) = 0, (2.25)
q(ξL〈rL, xL〉 + (1− ξL)〈rH, xH〉) = 0, (2.26)
αi = v
∗
i (βH , q) = vi(zi;βH, q) if xi(zi) > 0, i = L,H. (2.27)
By Proposition 2.2 we know that β∗H > 0, and it can be verified that q
∗ > 0.9 Thus,
incentive efficient allocations satisfy the following three properties. First, an agent
of type H is indifferent between her assignment and that of type L. Second, the
aggregate net trade is zero. Third, the lottery x∗i assigned to type i puts weight
only on net trades that maximize the net contribution of type i at prices q∗ and β∗H.
The third property leads to the following result which stems directly from the strict
concavity of vH(· ;β
∗
H, q
∗) and first-order conditions.
Proposition 2.3 x∗H is degenerate and provides full insurance.
Proposition 2.3 states that agents of type H should be fully insured when their
average consumption is lower than ω¯. Full insurance increases both the utility of type
H for a given resource cost and her incentives to report the truth (decreasing the
total cost of the assignment). Since the
incentive constraint of type L is not binding, type L wants to tell the truth. On
the other hand, more insurance to type L, while increasing her own utility, may raise
the incentives of type H to lie. For a given resource cost, an increase in insurance to
type L raises the total cost. As a result, the optimal assignment to type L is distorted
from full insurance. Since the total cost is not convex on zL, optimal assignments
may even be random. If utilities are type-invariant (as in Rothschild and Stiglitz [25]
and Wi lson [28]), however, optimal assignments to type L are deterministic.
Proposition 2.4 If utilities are type-invariant, then x∗L is degenerate and assigns
lower consumption in state 1 than in state 2.
Given the consumption level of type H, the planner chooses xL so as to increase
the utility of type L as much as possible without inducing type H to lie. For a given
resource cost, the planner may increase the net social contribution of type L (i.e.,
widen the gap between the utility of type L and the external cost of the assignment)
9q∗ cannot be zero. If UH is unbounded then vH (· ; β
∗, 0) is unbounded on Z, which contradicts
(2.27). If UH is bounded, then vH (· ; β
∗, 0) does not have a maximum (recall that limc→∞ Ui(c) = 0),
a contradiction since (D) is solvable and the support of x∗
H
is non-empty.
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by exploiting differences in the preferences of the two types. Because type L is more
likely to be in state 2 than type H, assignments which give higher consumption in
state 2 relative to state 1 are relatively more attractive for type L than for type
H. This explains why partial insurance to type L is incentive efficient. Lottery
assignments, in turn, exploit differences in preferences for risk. When utilities are
identical across types, there are no such differences and lotteries do not help enhance
efficiency. There are economies, however, where lotteries play a useful role. Consider
the extreme case where agents of type L are risk neutral and agents of type H are risk
averse. One can then easily devise a random allocation which is incentive compatible
and first best efficient. First, agents announcing type H are assigned their first best
deterministic consumption level. Agents announcing type L, on the other hand,
receive a non-degenerate lottery. Whereas the implied expected consumption (and,
hence, the utility) of type L is also the first best one, the risk involved is such that
the certainty equivalent that type-H agents assign to the lottery is no greater than
their own deterministic consumption. This prevents any misrepresentation.
The next proposition shows that, when type L is at least as risk averse as type H,
lotteries are not useful. Let Ai : R+ → R+ denote the index of absolute risk aversion
for type i; that is, Ai(c) = −
U ′′
i
(c)
U ′
i
(c)
for c ∈ R+.
Proposition 2.5 If AL(c) ≥ AH(c) for all c ∈ R+, then x
∗
L is degenerate and assigns
lower consumption in state 1 than in state 2.
2.5.2 The incentives of type-L agents
An analysis analogous to the one in the previous section allows us to characterize
incentive efficient allocations in which the incentive constraint of type L binds. In
this case, incentive efficient allocations provide full insurance to type L and over
insurance to type H. Full insurance to a type-L agent increases her utility as well as
her incentive to tell the truth. The optimal way to induce type L to tell the truth is to
provide over insurance to type H. Intuitively, an over insured position is less attractive
for type-L agents than for type-H agents since the former are less likely to be in
the low endowment state. If type L is sufficiently more risk averse than type H, the
assignment to type H may be random, since type L is more reluctant to accept random
assignments than type H. By contrast, if type H is at least as risk averse as type L,
optimal assignments to type H are deterministic. The next proposition summarizes
the properties of incentive efficient allocations when the incentive constraint of type
L binds.
16
Proposition 2.6 For any γL ∈ (0, γ¯L), incentive efficient allocations satisfy the
following.
(i) x∗L is degenerate and provides full insurance; and
(ii) If utilities are type-invariant, then x∗H is degenerate and assigns higher con-
sumption in state 1 than in state 2. More generally, if utilities are not type
invariant, and AH(c) ≥ AL(c) for all c ∈ R+, then x
∗
H is degenerate and assigns
higher consumption in state 1 than in state 2.
3 Moral Hazard
3.1 The Economy
Consider an exchange economy with two goods, namely time and a single consumption
good, and a measure one of ex ante identical agents. Each agent faces an idiosyncratic
shock leading to two possible states, s = 1, 2. In state s, the agent is endowed with
ωs units of consumption where 0 < ω1 < ω2. Prior to the realization of the shock,
the agent is endowed with one unit of time which he allocates between leisure and
effort in preventing the realization of state 1. Each agent can choose to exert either
high or low effort, with the set of effort levels denoted by E = {eL, eH}, where
0 < eL < eH < 1. Exerting high rather than low effort reduces the probability that
the agent will end up in state 1. The probability of state 1 with high and low effort
will be denoted by θH and θL, respectively, so that 0 < θH < θL < 1. Agents have von
Neumann-Morgerstern preferences as defined by the utility function u : E×R+ → R.
The utility of consumption c under effort ei is given by Ui(c) = u(ei, c), where Ui is
assumed twice continuously differentiable, strictly increas ing, and strictly concave
with limc→0 U
′
i(c) = ∞ and limc→∞ U
′
i(c) = 0. Since effort is costly, we assume that
there is some positive constant d such that UL(c)− UH(c) > d for all c ∈ R+.
Idiosyncratic shocks are independent and render no aggregate uncertainty. The
ex-post average endowment of the agents who provide effort ei is then given by
ω¯i = θiω1 + (1 − θi)ω2. The structure of uncertainty is common knowledge and
the realization of the endowment shocks is observable. State-contingent net trades
are perfectly verifiable and fully enforceable. However, effort is private information.
3.2 Allocations
In this section, we define feasible and incentive compatible allocations. Then
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we define incentive efficient allocations.
Let Z ⊂ R2+ denote the net trade set of an agent. For any z = (z1, z2) ∈ Z, the
expected net trade of an agent with effort ei is
ri(z1, z2) = θiz1 + (1− θi)z2,
and his expected utility is given by
EUi(z1, z2) = θiUi(ω1 + z1) + (1− θi)Ui(ω2 + z2).
An allocation in this economy specifies an effort level and a net trade for each
agent. Both specifications are allowed to be random and are given as follows. First,
the agent receives a lottery which prescribes an effort level. After the agent chooses
his effort and conditional on the prescription received, a second lottery specifies a net
trade. It is useful for our purposes to describe an allocation as a pair of measures
(xL, xH) ∈ Mc(Z)×Mc(Z) such that
〈I, xL + xH〉 = 1, xi ≥ 0, i = L,H.
10 (3.28)
Here, ||xi|| = 〈I, xi〉 is the probability that effort ei is specified in the first lottery, and
the equality in (3.28) is an adding-up condition.11 In addition, 1
||xi||
xi is a probability
measure which describes the random net trade assigned conditional on specification
ei (i.e., the second lottery). Note that the uncertainty involved in an allocation is
resolved in two steps. In the first step, the agent may be uncertain about the effort
that he will be asked to provide. This occurs when both ||xL|| and ||xH|| are positive.
In the second step, the agent finds out his effort specification, but he may be uncertain
about his contingent consumption plan. This occurs when 1
||xi||
xi is a non-degenerate
measure. Allowing for random effort is natural since the consumption set, E × R+,
displays indivisibilities.12 As we shall see, the role for random net trade assignments
arises from the unobservability of effort.
From the perspective of the entire economy, ||xi|| is the fraction of agents who are
assigned ei, and
1
||xi||
xi is the distribution of their net trades. The ex-post aggregate
net trade of these agents is given by 〈ri, xi〉 =
∫
Z
ridxi (provided the agents conform to
their specification). An allocation is feasible if the aggregate net trade is non-positive:
〈rL, xL〉 + 〈rH , xH〉 ≤ 0. (3.29)
11Here, ||xi|| = 〈I, xi〉 = xi(Z) is the total variation of xi.
12It is well known that lotteries play a role in when consumption sets are non-convex. See Shell
and Wright [26].
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When effort ei is specified but ej is the actual effort provided, the agent’s expected
utility is 1
||xi||
〈EUj , xi〉. An allocation is incentive compatible if it is not in the interest
of the agents to deviate from their specifications:
〈EUi, xi〉 ≥ 〈EUj, xi〉, j 6= i, i = L,H. (3.30)
An incentive efficient allocation is a feasible and incentive compatible allocation
that maximizes the ex-ante expected utility of the agents.
3.3 The Primal and Dual Problems
An incentive efficient allocation can be determined as a solution to a planning pro-
blem, more precisely a dual LSIP problem. The problem is to choose an allocation
(xL, xH) ∈ Mc(Z)×Mc(Z) that solves
(D) sup 〈EUL, xL〉+ 〈EUH , xH〉
s.t.
〈I, xL + xH〉 = 1, (3.31)
−〈EUL, xL〉 + 〈EUH , xL〉 ≤ 0, (3.32)
〈EUL, xH〉 − 〈EUH , xH〉 ≤ 0, (3.33)
〈rL, xL〉+ 〈rH , xH〉 ≤ 0, (3.34)
xL, xH ≥ 0. (3.35)
The primal LSIP problem consists of finding a quadruple (α, βL, βH, q) ∈ R
4 that
solves
(P ) inf α
s.t.
α ≥ EUL(z)− βL[EUH(z)−EUL(z)]− qrL(z) ∀z ∈ Z, (3.36)
α ≥ EUH(z)− βH [EUL(z)− EUH(z)]− qrH(z) ∀z ∈ Z, (3.37)
βL, βH, q ≥ 0, (3.38)
where α, (βL, βH), and q are the shadow prices of the adding-up constraint (3.31),
the incentive constraints (3.32)-(??), and the resource constraint (3.34), respectively.
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In the Appendix, we show that problems (P ) and (D) have optimal solutions and
that their optimal values coincide. We also show that, in characterizing incentive effi-
cient allocations, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to measures with
finite support. These results are analogous to Theorems 2.2 and 2.1 and Proposition
2.1 in Section 2.3.
3.4 Incentive Efficiency
In this section, we characterize incentive efficient allocations. Since the aggregate
endowment is constant, under full information it is optimal that each agent consumes
with certainty the average endowment in the economy. However, since effort is costly
and cannot be publicly observed, an agent who is fully insured will shirk to low effort
when high effort is specified. For this reason, allocations which specify high effort
with positive probability can only provide partial insurance. On the other hand,
agents must be subject to the minimum risk possible that is compatible with their
incentives to conform to a high-effort specification. So the incentive constraint (??)
binds with βH > 0. Implementing a low-effort specification is trivial. Since the
incentive constraint (3.32) does not bind, we may let βL = 0.
The first constraint system in problem (P ) is given by
α ≥ vL(zL; q) ∀zL ∈ Z, (3.39)
where the function
vL(zL; q) = EUL(zL)− qrL(zL) (3.40)
represents the net contribution to social welfare with low effort. The first term in
(3.40) is the contribution to welfare when agents are assigned effort eL and net trade
zL. The second term is the value of the associated aggregate net trade when the
shadow price of the good is q. Note that, since there are no welfare effects of incentives,
the net social contribution with low effort is the same both under full and private
information.
The second constraint system is given by
α ≥ vH(zH;βH, q) ∀zH ∈ Z, (3.41)
where the function
vH(zH;βH, q) = EUH(zH)− qrH(zH)− βH[EUL(zH)− EUH(zH)] (3.42)
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represents the net contribution to social welfare with high effort. The first and second
terms in (3.42) are the contribution to welfare when agents are assigned effort eH
and net trade zH , and the value of the associated aggregate net trade, respectively.
The third term is the welfare effect of incentives. If the net trade assigned is such
that the agent has incentives to deviate to eL, the term is negative and reflects a
welfare cost which is proportional to the utility gain in the deviation. If the net
trade assigned is such that the agent wants to conform to eH, the term is positive and
reflects a benefit which is proportional to the utility loss that a deviation would imply.
The direct (i.e. full information) net contribution of the assignment is thus adjusted
upward (downward) when it gives the right (wrong) incentives. The total cost of an
assignment under high effort is given by the resource cost net of the w elfare effect of
incentives: qrH(zH) + βH[EUL(zH) − EUH(zH)]. Note that the cost function is not
convex.
The maximal net contributions with high and low effort at prices βH and q are:
v∗L(q) ≡ sup
zL∈Z
vL(zL; q), (3.43)
v∗H(βH, q) ≡ sup
zH∈Z
vH(zH;βH, q). (3.44)
It is thus possible to write conditions (3.39)-(3.41) as
α ≥ v∗(βH , q),
where v∗(βH, q) is the largest of the two maximal net social contributions:
v∗(βH, q) ≡ max{v
∗
L(q), v
∗
H(βH, q)}. (3.45)
Because the objective of the primal problem is to minimize α, the optimal prices
β∗H and q
∗ are determined by minimizing v∗(βH , q):
(β∗H, q
∗) ∈ arg
{
min
βH ,q≥0
{
v∗(βH, q)
}
,
while optimal net contribution is given by α∗ = v∗(β∗H, q
∗).
We now turn to the characterization of incentive efficient allocations. According
to the complementary slackness theorem, if (α, βH, q) and (xL, xH) are feasible for
problems (P ) and (D), respectively, then they are optimal if and only if:
βH(〈EUL −EUH , xH〉) = 0, (3.46)
q(〈rL, xL〉 + 〈rH , xH〉) = 0, (3.47)
α = v∗(βH, q) = vi(zi;βH, q) if xi(zi) > 0, i = L,H. (3.48)
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We have already noted that β∗H > 0, and it can be checked that q
∗ > 0. Thus, an
incentive efficient allocation (x∗L, x
∗
H) has the following three properties. First, when
eH is assigned, the agent is indifferent between exerting effort (eH) and shirking (eL).
Second, the aggregate net trade is zero. Third, x∗i puts weight only on net trades
which achieve the optimal net contribution. That is, x∗L(zL) is positive provided:
(i) zL maximizes vL(· ; q
∗), and (ii) vL(q
∗) = v∗(βH, q). Similarly, x
∗
H(zH) is positive
provided: (i) zH maximizes vH(· ;β
∗
H, q
∗), and (ii) vH(βH, q
∗) = v∗(βH , q). The follow-
ing proposition follows from the third property and is a direct result of the strict
concavity of vL(· ; q
∗) and first-order conditions.
Proposition 3.1 If ||x∗L|| > 0 then x
∗
L is degenerate and provides full insurance.
Since a low effort assignment does not generate incentive effects, an agent who
is assigned eL should be fully insured. Under a high effort specification, however,
an increase in insurance may raise the incentives to shirk (increasing the shadow
cost of the assignment). Since the shadow cost function is not a convex, net trade
assignments under high effort may even be random. If utility is separable in effort
and consumption, however, optimal assignments under high effort are deterministic.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that utility is separable in consumption and effort. If
||x∗H|| > 0 then x
∗
H is degenerate and assigns lower consumption in state 1 than
in state 2.
The planner would like to increase as much as possible the utility of agents who
are specified high effort without adversely affecting their incentives. The planner may
increase the net contribution with high effort by exploiting differences in preferences
with high and low effort. Partial insurance makes high effort relatively more attractive
because it raises the probability of being in the high consumption state. Random net
trade assignments exploit differences in preferences for risk. When utility is separable,
there are not such differences and random net trade assignments are not optimal.
Consider, however, the extreme case where an agent is risk neutral when his effort
is high and risk averse when it is low. Then it is easy to find a random allocation
which is incentive compatible and first best efficient. In this allocation, agents who
are specified high effort are assigned a random net trade which yields the first best
expected consumption and involves sufficient risk for the agent not to have incentives
to shirk to low effort.
The next proposition shows that, if risk aversion does not decrease with effort,
random net trade assignments are not optimal.13 Let Ai : R+ → R+ be the index of
13Arnott and Stiglitz [3] derive this result through a different argument.
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absolute risk aversion of an agent with effort ei; that is, Ai(c) = −
U ′′
i
(c)
U ′
i
(c)
for c ∈ R+.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose that AH(c) ≥ AL(c) for all c ∈ R+. If ||x
∗
L|| > 0 then x
∗
H
is degenerate and assigns lower consumption in state 1 than in state 2.
Remark. The conditions which characterize incentive efficient allocations with
adverse selection and moral hazard are very similar (conditions (2.25)-(2.27) and
(3.46)-(3.48), respectively). Their main differences relate to the definition of the
net contribution functions in each model, and thereby in the third condition of the
characterization. The net contributions differ in the terms which describe the welfare
effects of incentives. With adverse selection, the assignments of both types generate
incentive effects. In particular, the assignment of the type with the highest average
consumption generates external costs because it affects the truth-telling incentives of
the other type. With moral hazard, only the assignments of those agents who are
specified high effort generate incentive effects. In this case, it is the incentives of
these agents (not the incentives of others) that are affected.14 A second important
difference is that, while in the adverse selection model the fraction of each type is
exogenously given, in the moral hazard model the fraction of people who provide
each effort level is endogenous. As a result, whereas in the first model the net social
contributions of the two types are defined independently, in the second model the
net social contributions with high and low effort are inter-related. In particular, the
optimal maximal net contribution is the largest of the maximal contributions with
high and low effort at the optimal prices.
The remainder of this section focuses on optimal effort assignments. To avoid
trivial solutions, we assume throughout that it is not incentive efficient to assign low
effort with probability one and to provide the agents with full insurance.15 Below we
give conditions under which the optimal effort is random.
Consider the most preferred allocation which is feasible and incentive compatible,
and specifies high effort with probability one. There may exists a feasible and incen-
tive compatible allocation which specifies low effort with positive probability and is
strictly preferred by the agents. When a fraction of the population provides low ef-
fort, the aggregate endowment decreases. Yet, if this fraction is taken to be small, the
14The source of this difference is the different form of the incentive constraints in the two models.
Whereas with adverse selection both incentive constraints depend on assignments of the two types
xL and xH , with moral hazard the (relevant) incentive constraint depends only on the net trade
assignment under high effort xH .
15Assume there exists a feasible and incentive compatible allocation (xL, xH) such that xL = 0
and 〈EUH , xH〉 > UL(ω¯L).
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loss in endowment is also small. Starting from the original high effort allocation, it is
feasible to give an arbitrarily high fixed consumption to a sufficiently small fraction
of agents and allow these agents to provide low effort without decreasing the average
consumption of others by too much. The cost of introducing this lottery is that, due
to a reduction in expected consumption, agents are slightly worse off if high effort
is specified. The benefit is that, ex ante, every agent has a positive probability of
being fully insured, exerting less effort and receiving a highly subsidized consumption
level.16 Since marginal utility of consumption decreases to zero, the cost of giving up
a small amount of expected consumption becomes negligible as agents get wealthier.
However, the disutility of effort is strictly positive. Proposition 3.4 asserts that, under
the natural assumption that marginal utility of consumption does not increase with
effort (decrease with leisure) and as long as the loss in expected endowment from
switching from high to low effort, ω¯H − ω¯L, is bounded, agents are willing to give up
some expected consumption to participate in the lottery provided they are sufficiently
wealthy.
Proposition 3.4 Suppose that
(i) U ′H(c) ≤ U
′
L(c) for all c ∈ R+, and
(ii) (θL − θH)(ω2 − ω1) < M for some constant M , so (ω¯H − ω¯L) is bounded.
Then there exists a threshold ωˆH such that, if ω¯H ≥ ωˆH then ||x
∗
H|| < 1 .
In recent work, Bennardo and Chiappori [4] study a moral hazard environment
where the optimal effort is typically random.17 In their model, consumption and
leisure are assumed to be complementary goods, so that the marginal utility of con-
sumption decreases with effort, and the cost of effort increases with consumption.
An important result in that paper is that, if the marginal utility of consumption de-
creases fast enough with effort then there may be a limit to the amount of expected
consumption that the agent can receive while still being willing to provide high ef-
fort. Put differently, a really wealthy individual may have no incentive to provide
high effort. When the aggregate endowment exceeds a threshold level, part of the
available resources cannot be consumed if high effort is specified with probability one.
In this case, the best high-effort allocation implies an strictly negative aggregate net
trade and cannot be incentive efficient. In terms of our former discussion, what is
16That is, of “winning the lottery” and reducing effort.
17Most models in the partial equilibrium literature consider only deterministic effort prescriptions.
See, however, the general equilibrium model of Prescott and Townsend [23].
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special about this case is that the lottery described in the previous paragraph can be
implemented at no cost (provided that the probability of a low effort specification is
sufficiently low) as there are resources available for free! The following proposition
establishes the result formally.
Proposition 3.5 Suppose that
(i) U ′H(c) ≤ U
′
L(c) for all c ∈ R+, and
(ii) limc→∞
U ′
H
(c)
U ′
L
(c)
= 0.
Then there exists a threshold ωˇH such that, if ω¯H ≥ ωˇH then any allocation with
||xH|| = 1 satisfies the resource constraint (3.34) with strict inequality. In this case,
||x∗H|| < 1.
Proposition 3.5 is a similar, slightly stronger result than the result in Bennardo and
Chiappori [4, Lemma 3.6]. It shows that the key assumption behind the Bennardo-
Chiappori result is that marginal utility of consumption ought to decrease faster with
high than with low effort (Assumption (ii)). The main difference between Propositions
3.4 and 3.5 is that random effort prescriptions may be optimal in economies where
agents have relatively low endowment provided that the ratio
U ′
H
(c)
U ′
L
(c)
goes to zero
sufficiently fast.
Appendix A
A.1 The Linear Semi-Infinite Programming Problems
In this section, we set up the primal LSIP problem and derive its dual. Following
Charnes, Cooper and Kortanek [8], we define the restricted dual problem, so-called
dual problem in Haar’s sense. The LSIP
problems in Sections 2 and 3 obtain as particular cases of the problems in this
section by applying the definitions in Table I.
A.1.1 The Primal Problem
Let 1 ≤ m ≤ n and Rn be equipped with the Euclidean norm and partially ordered
by means of the cone
Knm = { y ∈ R
n : yj ≥ 0, j = 1, ...,m}.
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Let ω ∈ R2+ and define Z = { z ∈ R
2 : z ≥ −ω }. Let C(Z) denote the vector
space of continuous real-valued functions on Z, endowed with the topology of uniform
convergence on compact sets and partially ordered by means of the cone
C+(Z) = { f ∈ C(Z) : f(z) ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ Z }.
The primal problem is to find y ∈ Rn to solve
(P ) inf c · y
s.t. Ay ≥ b,
y ∈ Knm,
where c ∈ Rn, b = (bL, bH) ∈ C(Z) × C(Z), and A : R
n → C(Z) × C(Z) is a
continuous linear mapping. Problem (P ) is linear and has n unknowns and infinitely
many constraints. Denote its optimal value by ν(P ).
A.1.2 The Dual Problem
Let Mc(Z) denote the space of signed Borel measures on Z which have compact
support and are finite on compact sets. This space is the topological dual space of
C(Z) (Hewitt [16]).
Let C(Z)× C(Z) be paired in duality with Mc(Z) ×Mc(Z). The reflexive space
R
n is paired with itself. The two pairings are endowed with their natural bilinear
forms (to highlight the dimensionality of the spaces in the pairing we use the dot
product and bracket notation for finite and infinite dimensions, respectively):
〈f, x〉 =
∫
Z
fLdxL +
∫
Z
fHdxH , f = (fL, fH) ∈ C(Z)× C(Z),
x = (xL, xH) ∈ Mc(Z)×Mc(Z);
y · z =
n∑
j=1
yjzj, y ∈ R
n, z ∈ Rn.
The adjoint of A, A∗ : Mc(Z)×Mc(Z) → R
n, is defined by the relation
y · (A∗x) = 〈Ay, x〉, for all y ∈ Knm, x ∈ Mc+(Z)×Mc+(Z). (A.1)
We may write Ay =
∑n
j=1 yjfj, where fj = (fjL, fjH) ∈ C(Z)×C(Z) for j = 1, · · · , n.
Then (A.1) can be expressed as
y · (A∗x) =
n∑
j=1
yj〈fj , x〉, for all y ∈ K
n
m, x ∈ Mc+(Z)×Mc+(Z). (A.2)
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Write A∗x ≤ c as
n∑
j=1
yj(〈fj, x〉 − cj) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ K
n
m.
The dual problem is to find x ∈ Mc(Z)×Mc(Z) to solve
(D) sup 〈b, x〉
s.t. 〈fj , x〉 ≤ cj, j = 1, ...,m,
〈fj , x〉 = cj , j = m + 1, ..., n,
x ≥ 0.
Problem (D) is a linear programming problem with infinitely many unknowns and
n constraints. Denote its optimal value by ν(D). By the weak duality theorem
(Krabs [19, Theorem I.3.1]), ν(D) ≤ ν(P ).
A.1.3 The Dual Problem in Haar’s Sense
Let R(Z) denote the vector space of all functions λi : Z → R which vanish outside a
finite subset of Z. For any λi ∈ R
(Z), we define the supporting set of λi as
supp λi = {zi ∈ Z : λi(zi) 6= 0}.
Let C(Z)× C(Z) be paired in duality with R(Z) × R(Z), with bilinear form
〈f, λ〉 =
∑
zL∈suppλL
fL(zL)λL(zL) +
∑
zH∈suppλH
fH(zH)λH(zH),
f = (fL, fH) ∈ C(Z)×C(Z), λ = (λL, λH) ∈ R
(Z) × R(Z).
The dual problem in Haar’s sense is to find λ ∈ R(Z) × R(Z) to solve
(DF ) sup 〈b, λ〉
s.t. 〈fj, λ〉 ≤ cj , j = 1, ...,m,
〈fj, λ〉 = cj, j = m + 1, ..., n,
λ ≥ 0.
Problem (DF ) is also a linear programming problem with infinitely many unknowns
and n constraints. Denote its optimal value by ν(DF ). To see the relation between
problems (D) and (DF ) denote the set of finitely supported Borel measures on Z
by MF . Also, denote the Dirac measure at z ∈ Z by δz (i.e., for any Borel set
B ⊂ Z, δz(B) = 1 if z ∈ B and δz(B) = 0 otherwise). Any pair λ = (λL, λH) ∈
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Adverse Selection Moral Hazard
(n,m) (5, 3) (4, 3)
y (βL, βH, q, αL, αH) (βL, βH, q, α)
c (0, 0, 0, 1, 1) (0, 0, 0, 1)
b = (bL, bH) (γLEUL, (1 − γL)EUH) (EUL, EUH)
f1 = (f1L, f1H) (−EUL, EUL) (−EUL + EUH , 0)
f2 = (f2L, f2H) (EUH,−EUH) (0, EUL − EUH)
f3 = (f3L, f3H) (ξLrL, (1− ξL)rH) (rL, rH)
f4 = (f4L, f4H) (I, 0) (I,I)
f5 = (f5L, f5H) (0,I) —–
Table I: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
R
(Z) × R(Z) corresponds to a pair of finitely supported measures x = (xL, xH) where
xi =
∑
zi∈suppλi
λi(zi)δzi for i = L,H. Thus, the space R
(Z) × R(Z) is isomorphic
to MF × MF . This implies that problem (DF ) is equivalent to problem (D) when
dual variables are restricted to lie in the subset MF ×MF of Mc(Z)×Mc(Z). Thus,
ν(DF ) ≤ ν(D).
A.2 Proofs of Theorems 2.2 and 2.1 and Proposition 2.1
We begin with three preliminary Lemmas. To prove Lemma A.1 we appeal to the
properties of the expected utility EUi and the expected net trade functions ri defined
in Table I. In particular, we use the continuity and strict concavity of EUi, the
fact that marginal utility of consumption decreases asymptotically to zero, and the
linearity of ri. The proof also uses the fact that at most one incentive constraint
binds in problem (D).
Lemma A.1 There exists a compact subset T ⊂ Z such that, if all the constraints
which are associated with elements z ∈ Z|T are eliminated from problem (P ) then the
set of optimal solutions does not change.
Proof. Let Y denote the set of feasible solutions in problem (P ). That is, y ∈ Y if
and only if y ∈ Knm and
0 ≥ hi(zi, y) ≡ bi(zi)−
n∑
j=1
yjfji(zi) for all zi ∈ Z, i = L,H. (A.3)
(See Table I). Note that Y is a closed convex subset of Rn. We establish the Lemma
through a sequence of claims.
28
Claim 1: Y is non-empty.
Proof: This follows straightforwardly from (A.3) given the strict concavity of bi and
the linearity of fmi for i = L,H (see Table I).
Claim 2: If y ∈ Y then y ≥ 0. Further, there exist constants Mj, j = 1, . . . , n, such
that any optimal solution to problem (P ) lies in the set
M = {y ∈ Y : yj ≤ Mj , j = 1, . . . , n}.
Proof: By definition, any y ∈ Y satisfies yj ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . ,m. Now, fmi(0) = 0
and utilities can be normalized so bi(0) = 0. Because 0 ∈ Z, (A.3) implies that
yj ≥ 0 for j ≥ m + 1. The existence of Mj for j ≥ m + 1 follows from Claim 1 and
the primal o bjective function. By the weak duality theorem and since autarky is a
feasible solution for problem (D),
bL(0) + bH(0) ≤ ν(D) ≤ ν(P ) ≤
n∑
j=m+1
Mj .
Finally, since at most one incentive constraint binds in problem (D), it can be verified
using (A.3) that at an optimal solution yj is bounded above for 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Claim 3: There is some  > 0 such that ym >  for all y ∈ M .
Proof: Assume not. Then there exists a sequence {yk} in M such that 0 ≤ ykm <
1
k
for all k ∈ N. Since at most one incentive constraint binds, without loss of generality
let y1 = 0. Then, for some i and any y ∈ Y ,
0 ≥ hi(zi, y) ≥ bi(zi)− ymfmi(zi)− yn, for all zi ∈ Z. (A.4)
Since holds (A.4) for y = yk, rearranging and taking limits gives
lim
k→∞
ykn ≥ bi(zi)− lim
k→∞
ykmfmi(zi) = bi(zi), ∀zi ∈ Z.
Hence,
lim
k→∞
ykn ≥ bi(zi), ∀zi ∈ Z.
When utility is unbounded, limk→∞ y
k
m+1 = ∞, thereby contradicting Claim 2. When
utility is bounded, limzi→∞ bi(zi) = Bi. But Mn can then always be found in (0, Bi),
leading to a similar contradiction.
Claim 4: There is a z¯ such that, for each i = L,H and any y ∈ M , ∇hi(zi, y) << 0
for all zi > z¯.
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Proof: Without loss of generality, take i = L. From Table I, ∇fjL = 0 for j ≥ m+1.
Also, ∇fmL(zL) = g¯L >> 0. Then
∇hL(zL, y) = ∇bL(zL)−
m∑
j=1
yj∇fjL(zL)
= ∇bL(zL)−
m−1∑
j=1
yj(∇f
+
jL(zL)−∇f
−
jL(zL))− ymg¯L,
where ∇f+jL and ∇f
−
jL ≥ 0 stand for the positive and negative parts of ∇fjL. This
together with Claims 2 and 3 implies
∇hL(zL, y) ≤ ∇bL(zL) +
m−1∑
j=1
Mj∇f
−
jL(zL)− g¯L, for all zL ∈ Z.
But as marginal utility decreases asymptotically to zero:
lim
zL→+∞
∇bL(zL) = 0,
lim
zL→+∞
∇fjL(zL) = 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1,
and this gives
lim
zL→+∞
∇hL(zL, y) = −g¯L << 0.
Since hL(·, y) is a continuously differentiable, there exists a constant z¯L such that
∇hL(zL, y) << 0 for all zL > z¯L. A similar derivation gives z¯H . Setting z¯ =
max{z¯L, z¯H} proves our claim.
Claim 5: The set T = [−ω1, z¯]× [−ω2, z¯] satisfies Lemma ??.
Proof: Claim 5 is direct from Claim 4. This completes the proof of Lemma A.1. 
Consider the LSIP problems which arise by replacing Z by T in problems (P ),
(D) and (DF ). Denote these problems by (P
T ), (DT ) and (DTF ), respectively. The
proofs of Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.3 below appeal to some well-known results in
LSIP theory. The proof of Lemma A.2 exploits also the strict concavity of EUi and
the linearity of ri.
Lemma A.2 The system of constraints in problem (P T ) is canonically closed in the
sense of Charnes, Cooper and Kortanek [9].
Proof. First, since T is compact and since for all i and j bi and fji are continuous,
the set
{(f1(t), f2(t), . . . , fn(t), b(t)) : t ∈ T}
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is compact in Rn+1.
Second, the Slater constraint qualification is satisfied. To see this, let y0j = 0 for
1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1 and let y0m > 0 be given. Since, fmi is linear and bi is strictly concave,
there exist constants aL > 0 and aH > 0 and values for y
0
j for j ≥ m + 1 such that,
0 ≥ hL(zL, y
0) = bL(zL)− y
0
mfmL(zL)− y
0
m+1 + aL, for all zL ∈ Z,
0 ≥ hH(zH, y
0) = bH(zH)− y
0
mfmH(zH)− y
0
n + aH, for all zH ∈ Z.
That is, y0 is a Slater point. 
Lemma A.3 Problem (DTF ) is solvable and ν(D
T
F ) = ν(D
T ) = ν(P T ).
Proof. By weak duality of the pair {(P T ,DT )}, and the definition of (DTF ),
ν(DTF ) ≤ ν(D
T ) ≤ ν(P T ).
Given Lemma A.2, the inhomogeneous Haar theorem of Charnes, Cooper and Kor-
tanek [8, Theorem 3] implies that the system of constraints in (PT ) has the Farkas-
Minkoswki property. Since (P T ) and (DTF ) are consistent, the extended dual theorem
of Charnes, Cooper and Kortanek [8, Theorem 4] implies then that (DTF ) is solvable
and that ν(DTF ) = ν(P
T ). 
We are now ready to prove Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, and Proposition 2.1.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. By weak duality of the pair {(P ), (D)}, and the definition
of (DF ),
ν(DF ) ≤ ν(D) ≤ ν(P ).
Also, since R(T ) ⊂ R(Z), it follows that ν(DTF ) ≤ ν(DF ). By Lemma A.1, ν(P ) =
ν(P T ). But then, Lemma A.3 implies that ν(DF ) = ν(D) = ν(P ). 
Proof of Proposition 2.1. The proof of Theorem 2.1 establishes that ν(DF ) =
ν(D). It also implies that ν(DTF ) = ν(DF ). Since by Lemma A.3, (D
T
F ) is solvable, so
is (DF ). 
Proof of Theorem 2.2. The solvability of (D) follows from Proposition 2.1. By
Claims 1 and 2 in Lemma A.1, Y is non-empty and may be assumed bounded. Since
Y is closed, problem (P ) maximizes a continuous function on a compact set, and so
its value is attained. 
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A.3 Proofs of Proposition 2.2 and 2.4 to 2.6, and 3.4 to 3.5
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Let (x∗, x∗) denote the first best equal treatment allo-
cation: x∗ = δz∗ with z
∗ = (z∗1, z
∗
2) and z
∗
s = ω¯ − ωs for s = 1, 2. Since (x
∗, x∗) is
incentive compatible, it is also incentive efficient. Let γ¯L and γ¯H be the associated
weights in problem (D). Using first-order conditions,
v′i(z
∗; q∗) = γ¯iU
′
i(ω¯)− ξiq
∗ = 0, i = 1, 2.
Writing γ¯H = 1 − γ¯L and rearranging gives
γ¯L =
(
1 +
(1 − ξL)U
′
L(ω¯)
ξLU
′
H(ω¯)
)−1
.
Any other incentive efficient allocation (x∗L, x
∗
H) is such that either (i) one type is
strictly better off, or (ii) both types are indifferent. Assume (i) and suppose, without
loss of generality, that type L is better off. Then, γL > γ¯L. Since x
∗ provides full
insurance, the expected consumption of type L must exceed ω¯ and, by feasibility, that
of type H must be lower than ω¯. But then,
〈UL, x
∗
H〉 < 〈UL, x
∗〉 < 〈UL, x
∗
L〉,
so the incentive constraint of type L is does not bind (βL = 0). Since the incentive
constraint of type H is satisfied, x∗L entails only partial insurance. This constraint
must bind with βH > 0; otherwise, the utility of type L could be increased by reducing
the risk in x∗L and maintaining the expected consumption.
Case (ii) is impossible. If each type i is indifferent between x∗i and x
∗ then (x∗L, x
∗
H)
must give both types an expected consumption of at least ω¯. But, by feasibility, the
expected consumption of both types must equal ω¯. Since (x∗L, x
∗
H) and (x
∗, x∗) are
different, at least one type i is not fully insured and strictly prefers x∗ to x∗i , a
contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4. We first show that, when Ui(·) = U(·) for i = L,H,
the function vL(· ;β
∗
H, q
∗) is strictly concave. This function is additive across states,
vL(zL;β
∗
H, q
∗) =
∑
s∈{1,2}
vLs(zLs;β
∗
H, q
∗),
where
vL1(zL1;β
∗
H, q
∗) =
(
γLθL − β
∗
HθH
)
U(w1 + zL1)− q
∗ξLθLzL1,
vL2(zL2;β
∗
H, q
∗) =
(
γL(1− θL)− β
∗
H(1− θH)
)
U(w2 + zL2)− q
∗ξL(1− θL)zL2.
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Since U ′′ < 0, for s = 1, 2, the second derivative v′′Ls never changes sign. Suppose
v
′′
Ls ≥ 0 for some s. Because U
′ > 0, then v′Ls < 0. But then, by condition (2.27), the
optimal assignment to type L is deterministic and such that ws + z
∗
Ls = 0, which is
impossible since limc→0 U
′
L(0) = ∞. We conclude that v
′′
Ls < 0 for s = 1, 2.
Since 0 < θL < θH < 1 and U
′′ < 0, the first-order conditions imply that the
maximum of vL(· ;β
∗
H, q
∗) satisfies ω1 + zL1 < ω2 + zL2. 
Proof of Proposition 2.5. We may write
vL(zL;β
∗
H, q
∗) =
∑
s∈{1,2}
vLs(zLs;β
∗
H, q
∗),
where
vL1(zL1;β
∗
H, q
∗) = γLθLUL(w1 + zL1)− β
∗
HθHUH(w1 + zL1)− q
∗ξLθLzL1,
vL2(zL2;β
∗
H, q
∗) = γL(1 − θL)UL(w2 + zL2)− β
∗
H(1 − θH)UH(w2 + zL2)
−q∗ξL(1 − θL)zL2.
We first show that, if AL(c) ≥ AH(c) for all c ∈ R+ then vL(· ;β
∗
H, q
∗) is strictly
concave. Write v′L1 = (g1 + g2)g3 where
g1 = γLθL
U ′
L
U ′
H
, g2 = −
(
β∗HθH +
q∗ξLθL
U ′
H
)
, g3 = U
′
H .
Clearly, g′2, g
′
3 < 0. Further,
1
γLθL
g1
′ =
(U ′′LU ′H − U ′LU ′′H
(U ′H)
2
)
=
((U ′′
L
U ′
H
U ′
L
U ′′
H
− 1
)
U ′LU
′′
H
(U ′H)
2
)
=
(( AL
AH
− 1
)
U ′LU
′′
H
(U ′H)
2
)
.
So AL ≥ AH implies g1
′ ≤ 0 and hence v′′L1 < 0. Finally, because 0 < θL < θH < 1,
v′′L1 < 0 implies v
′′
L2 < 0, which proves our claim.
Now g1
′ ≤ 0 is equivalent to
U ′
L
U ′
H
being non-increasing. Since 0 < θL < θH < 1 and
U ′′ < 0, the first-order conditions imply that the maximum of vL(· ;β
∗
H, q
∗) satisfies
ω1 + zL1 < ω2 + zL2. 
Proof of Proposition 2.6. For γL ∈ (0, γ¯L), the net contributions are:
vL(zL;βL, q) = γLEUL(zL)− qξLrL(zL) + βLEUL(zL),
vH(zH;βL, q) = (1 − γL)EUH(zH)− q(1− ξL)rH(zH)− βLEUL(zL).
Similar arguments to those in the proofs of Propositions 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 prove (i)
and (ii). 
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Proof of Proposition 3.2. Define U(·) = UH(·), so UL(·) = U(·) + d. Then
vH(zH;β
∗
H, q
∗) =
∑
s∈{1,2}
vHs(zHs;β
∗
H, q
∗),
where
vH1(zH1;β
∗
H, q
∗) =
(
(1 + β∗H)θH − β
∗
HθL
)
U(w1 + zH1)− q
∗θHzH1 − β
∗
HθLd,
vH2(zH2;β
∗
H, q
∗) =
(
(1 + β∗H)(1− θH)− β
∗
H(1 − θL)
)
U(w2 + zH2)− q
∗(1− θH)zH2
−β∗H(1 − θL)d.
Analogous arguments to those in the proof of Proposition 2.4 show that vH(· ;β
∗
H, q
∗)
is strictly concave and that its maximum is characterized by partial insurance. 
The proof of Proposition 3.3 is analogous to that of proposition 2.5 and is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Take an arbitrary endowment sequence {ωk} ⊂ R2+
such that limk→∞ ω¯
k
H = ∞ and ω¯
k
H − ω¯
k
L ≤ N for some constant N (with ω¯
k
i denoting
the average endowment with effort ei when ω = ω
k). Let (αk, βkH, q
k) and (xkL, x
k
H) be
optimal primal and dual solutions for ω = ωk.
Suppose that ||xkH|| = 1 for all k. Since q
k > 0, by condition (3.47), the support
of xkH becomes unbounded as k increases. Since β
k
H > 0, by condition (3.46), there is
a sequence {zkH} where z
k
H = (z
k
H1, z
k
H2) such that x
k
H(z
k
H) > 0 and limk→∞ z
k
H2 = ∞.
Write the first-order condition associated to (3.48) for s = 2 as(
1− θL
1 − θH
−
U ′H(w
k
2 + z
k
H2)
U ′L(w
k
2 + z
k
H2)
)
βkH =
U ′H(w
k
2 + z
k
H2)
U ′L(w
k
2 + z
k
H2)
−
qk
U ′L(w
k
2 + z
k
H2)
(A.5)
Since 0 ≤ θH ≤ θL ≤ 1, U
′
H ≤ U
′
L and β
k
H > 0, the right-hand side of (A.5) is
positive. The first term in the left-hand side of (A.5) is bounded above by one. But
as limc→∞ U
′
L(c) = 0, for (A.5) to hold, limk→∞ q
k = 0.
Let vkL(q
k) and vkH(β
k
H, q
k) denote the maximal net contributions with eL and eH
for ω = ωk. By condition (3.48) and equality of the primal and dual optimal values,
αk = vkH(β
k
H, q
k) = 〈EUH , x
k
H〉. (A.6)
Let c¯kH denote the certainty equivalent associated to x
k
H, so UH(c¯
k
H) = 〈EUH , x
k
H〉.
Since U ′′H < 0, then c¯
k
H < ω¯
k
H . Applying (3.43) for z
k
Ls = c¯
k
H − w
k
s , s = 1, 2, gives
vkL(q
k) ≥ UL(c¯
k
H)− q
k(c¯kH − ω¯
k
L) > UL(c¯
k
H)− q
k(ω¯kH − ω¯
k
L). (A.7)
Since limk→∞ q
k = 0 and limk→∞(ω¯
k
H − ω¯
k
L) ≤ M , (A.7) implies that for any  > 0
there is K such that UL(c¯
k
H) − v
k
L(q
k) ≤  for all k ≥ K. Fix  ≤ d.
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Because U ′′H < 0 and UL(·)− UH(·) = d, (A.6) implies
αk = 〈EUH , x
k
H〉 < UH(c¯
k
H) = UL(c¯
k
H)− d, (A.8)
and, since ||xkL|| = 0, by condition (3.48),
αk > vkL(q
k). (A.9)
(A.8) and (A.9) imply that UL(c¯
k
H) − v
k
L(q
k) > d, a contradiction if k ≥ K. We
conclude that ||xkH|| < 1 for all k ≥ K. 
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Suppose we restrict the allocations to satisfy xL = 0.
Take any endowment sequence {ωk} ⊂ R2+ with limk→∞ ω¯
k
H = ∞. Let (βˆ
k
H, qˆ
k) and xˆkH
be optimal primal and dual solutions to the restricted planner’s problem for ω = ωk.
The complementary slackness conditions in this case are obtained by letting xL = 0
in (3.46)-(3.48).
Suppose, in contrast to what we want to show, that 〈rH , xˆ
k
H〉 = 0 for all k. Since
(3.46) holds, there is a sequence {zkH} where z
k
H = (z
k
H1, z
k
H2) such that xˆ
k
H(z
k
H) > 0,
limk→∞ z
k
H2 = ∞, and (ωH2 + z
k
H2− ωH1− z
k
H1) ≥ 1 for some 1 > 0 and all k. Write
the first-order conditions associated to (3.48) as:(
θL
θH
−
U ′H(w
k
1 + z
k
H1)
U ′L(w
k
1 + z
k
H1)
)
βˆkH =
U ′H(w
k
1 + z
k
H1)
U ′L(w
k
1 + z
k
H1)
−
qˆk
U ′L(w
k
1 + z
k
H1)
, (A.10)
(
1− θL
1− θH
−
U ′H(w
k
2 + z
k
H2)
U ′L(w
k
2 + z
k
H2)
)
βˆkH =
U ′H(w
k
2 + z
k
H2)
U ′L(w
k
2 + z
k
H2)
−
qˆk
U ′L(w
k
2 + z
k
H2)
. (A.11)
Since limc→∞
U ′
H
(c)
U ′
L
(c)
= 0, taking limits in (A.11) yields(
1− θL
1− θH
)
lim
k→∞
βˆkH = − lim
k→∞
qˆk
U ′L(w
k
2 + z
k
H2)
,
which implies that limk→∞ βˆ
k
H = limk→∞ qˆ
k = 0.
For sufficiently large k, the right-hand side of (A.11) is positive, so qˆk < U ′H(w
k
2 +
zkH2). Since U
′′
L < 0 and ωH2 + z
k
H2 > ωH1 − z
k
H1, (A.10) implies(
θL
θH
−
U ′H(w
k
1 + z
k
H1)
U ′L(w
k
1 + z
k
H1)
)
βˆkH >
U ′H(w
k
1 + z
k
H1)
U ′L(w
k
1 + z
k
H1)
−
U ′H(w
k
2 + z
k
H2)
U ′L(w
k
2 + z
k
H2)
. (A.12)
But as Ui is continuously differentiable and (ωH2 + z
k
H2 − ωH1 − z
k
H1) ≥ 1, taking
limits and rearranging in (A.12) gives
lim
k→∞
βˆkH >
(
θL
θH
)−1
lim
k→∞
(
U ′H(w
k
1 + z
k
H1)
U ′L(w
k
1 + z
k
H1)
−
U ′H(w
k
2 + z
k
H2)
U ′L(w
k
2 + z
k
H2)
)
≥
(
θL
θH
)−1
2,
for some constant 2 > 0, a contradiction. 
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